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Yin: The Death Penalty Spectacle

THE DEATH PENALTY SPECTACLE
Tung Yin*

Capital punishment in the United States has a serpentine history. The death
penalty was the presumed sentence for a large swath of crimes during colonial times
(though often not imposed), and it was not constitutionally limited to punishment for
homicides until 1977. The Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972,3 but,
four years later, upheld the revised capital4 punishment schemes that numerous states had
instituted in response to the 1972 decision.
Since then, death penalty cases have produced plenty of spectacles. A ghastly
example occurred in 1997, when Florida's electric chair malfunctioned, causing flames to
burst from the condemned inmate's face mask.5 The state Attorney General took the
opportunity to warn future would-be killers, "better not do it in the state of Florida
because we may have a problem with our electric chair."6 An absurd example comes from
that same year, when David Lee Herman slashed his throat and wrists with a prison razor
in a suicide attempt; prison officials saved him only to continue with his execution two
days later.

I Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to Doug Beloof, Steve Kanter, and Aliza Kaplan for
helpful discussions and feedback, and to Jenevieve Swinford for excellent research assistance.
'See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6-7 (2012).

See Cokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (striking down the death penalty as punishment for non-fatal
rape). Notwithstanding Coker, Congress has continued to enact federal statutes authorizing capital punishment
for crimes such as large scale drug dealing. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (1994). In addition, espionage and treason
2

continue to carry a potential death penalty. Death Penaltyfor Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY

INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-41 (1972) (per curiam).
Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-77 (1976).
Miraya Navarro, Despite Fire, Electric ChairIs DefendedIn Florida,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at Al8.
6 John

Grogan, Chair, Injection . . How bout Guillotine?, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 1997,
at 1B; Tim Padgett,
What's Wrong With Florida'sPrisons, TIME MAG., Oct. 17, 2007,

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1672366,00.html.
Sam Howe Verhovek, Halt the Execution? Are You Crazy?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4, at 4. Herman is
one of many examples of inmates who have been saved after suicide attempts and still executed. See, e.g., Jim
Yardley, Texan Who Took Overdose Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at Al8 (quoting David Martin
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No matter what one's ultimate feelings about the legality or desirability of capital
punishment may be, it is difficult to find anything positive about Robert Alton Harris's
last night. Harris was strapped into the lethal gas chamber only to be unstrapped and sent
back to his cell due to a judicial stay, only then to have the stay lifted and to be strapped in
again, with the process repeating itself no fewer than three times. Eventually, the Supreme
Court got so fed up that it lifted the last stay of execution with a further order that "No
further stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts
except upon order of this Court." Harris was initially scheduled to die at 12:01 a.m., but
his execution did not actually take place until after six in the morning.9
The Harris debacle is, of course, an extreme example of the typical situation in
which capital punishment opponents, including obviously the death row inmate, take all
manner of steps to try to mobilize public opinion against execution. Where there is a
sympathetic defendant, the media may join in, adding fuel to the anti-capital punishment
sentiment.10 In these typical instances, the death row inmate quite understandably does not
want to be put to death.
Occasionally, however, there are situations that transcend the usual spectacle of
the inmate and abolitionists teaming up to try to stop the state from carrying out the
execution.
For example, one newspaper reported that many California death row
inmates, if not disenfranchised, would have voted against that state's Proposition 34,
which sought to abolish the death penalty. 12 This counterintuitive assessment makes sense
when one realizes that the ballot initiative would have the effect of eliminating the right to
appointed counsel for post-conviction proceedings,1 3 which are statutorily guaranteed only
for death row inmates. 14
15
But a 2011 case in Oregon goes beyond the theoretical into an actual absurdity.
In that case, an inmate who was condemned to death voluntarily waived his remaining
appeals, clearing the way for execution.16 His lawyers argued against his desired outcome,
leading him to fire his attorneys. 1 7 Oregon's Governor then issued a reprieve, suspending
the death sentence during his term in office-but not commuting it.1 8 Enter the inmate's

Long's lawyer as saying, "It seems like a pretty sick process when you jerk a guy out of intensive care on a
ventilator.... What's the huge rush?").
Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992); Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of
the PresentDiscontents: The Death Penalty Case ofRobert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345, 346, 374-78

(1992).
9See Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 8, at 346, 379.

'o One example was Karla Faye Tucker, who, along with her boyfriend, broke into another friend's house to steal
a motorcycle in 1983. While inside, they attacked the homeowner and his lover, killing both with repeated
hammer and axe blows. Both assailants were convicted of murder and received the death penalty. Tucker later
sought executive clemency on the ground that she had been under the influence of drugs at the time of the
killing, and that she had since convened to Christianity and become reformed. The prison warden supported this
latter contention. In part because she was scheduled to be the first woman to be executed in the United States
since 1984, her case drew large media attention. She was executed in 1998 by lethal injection. Sam Howe
Verhovek, Divisive Case ofKiller ofTwo Ends as Texas Executes Tucker, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at Al.

" To be sure, many executions take place without any spectacle. See Bob Egelko, Why Inmates Prefer to Keep
Death Penalty; Proposition34, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2012, at Al.
12 Id.
13

Id.

14

See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 68662 (West 2012).

* State v. Haugen, 266 P.3d 68 (Or. 2011).
1
17

Id. at 7 1.
Id.

" Haugenv. Kitzhaber, No. 12C16560,

¶ 4-6

(Or. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 3, 2012).
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new attorney, who brought suit to reject the Governor's reprieve, which the trial court
decided to grant.19 In other words, there is a strange spectacle where a death row inmate
successfully sues a state Governor for interfering with the inmate's decision to be
executed, only to have the Governor appeal that ruling.
This case is a fascinating commentary on, if nothing else, the fiscal waste of
having the death penalty in a state that rarely sentences defendants to death (about one per
year on average) and does not execute them unless they "volunteer" (only two have been
20
executed since 1962, and both waived their remaining appeals). On the other hand, while
abolition of the death penalty sounds appealing, this inmate's case raises a tricky question:
he was already serving a life without parole sentence when he murdered another inmate.2 1
How should society punish someone like this? Another life sentence is meaningless, and
even if one rejects retribution and deterrence as legitimate punishment rationales,
incapacitation seems appropriate-executing him would prevent him from killing any
other inmates (or guards).
There are, of course, other ways of protecting inmates from fellow inmates:
maybe murderous inmates could be subject to solitary confinement for the rest of their
lives. The direction of European courts, which have been ahead of our abolitionist
movement, as well as the experience here in the United States with Ramzi Yousef, one of
the deadliest terrorists in U.S. custody, suggests, however, that such conditions of solitary
confinement may become the new Eighth Amendment battleground.2 2

I.

THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE

Currently thirty-two states, the federal government, and the U.S. military retain
the death penalty as a potential punishment, almost exclusively for homicide with
23
aggravated circumstances. Debate over the legality and morality of capital punishment
24
has existed at least since Socrates' death.
In the 1700s, English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham launched one of the more enduring utilitarian-based arguments against the death
penalty,2 5 while his contemporary Immanuel Kant defended it in appropriate
circumstances as just "dessert."26 In 1972, Furman v. Georgia temporarily mooted the
issue in the United States by holding that the death penalty, as rendered in the cases before
the Supreme Court, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
'9 Id. at ¶ 26.

Cliff Collins, Let the Debate Begin: Oregon Lawyers with a Stake in the Issue Weigh in on
the Death Penalty,
72 OR. ST. B. BULL. 18, 18-20 (2012). See Summary ofDeath Row Inmates, OR. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS (June
16, 2011)
http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/PUBAFF/Pages/cappunishment/cappunishinent.aspx#List of Inmateson Deat
h Row.
21 Jonathan J. Cooper, Gary Haugen, Death Row Inmate, Can Reject Clemency, Judge Says, HUFFINGTON POST
20

(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/03/gary-haugen-death-row-inmn1739775.html.
22 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2003). See also ChristopherR.
Brauchli, From the
Wool Sack, 30 COLO. LAW. 35, 35 (2001) (citing European leaders asking the United States to abolish the death
penalty).
23 Crimes Punishableby Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Dec. 2011),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty#BJS. In May 2013, Maryland abolished
capital punishment, becoming the eighteenth state. See Joe Sutton, Marylandgovernor signs death penalty
repeal, CNN, May 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty.
24 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Bentham 's UtilitarianCritique ofthe Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

1033, 1036 (1983).
25

JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT, 168-197
(1775).

26 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140-45 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
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punishment.2 7 Now, forty years after Furman (and 36 years after the reinstatement of the
death penalty), there is a slight trend toward slow abolition of the death penalty:
*

In the past five years, six states have eliminated the death penalty from
their laws, increasing the ranks of abolitionist states to 18, an increase of
50 percent;28

*

Since peaking in 1999, the annual number of death row inmates who
have actually been executed has shown an uneven but decreasing
trend; 29

*

Over half of all executions in the United States since 1976 have taken
place in Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma (and over two-thirds with the
addition of Florida and Missouri). 3 0

This Part of the article briefly summarizes the primary arguments in opposition to
capital punishment so as to provide relevant context for evaluating the thorny question of
how to respond to prison inmates who kill other inmates or prison guards. 1
Immorality: Some capital punishment opponents argue that the death penalty is
something absolutely evil which like torture, should never be used however many lives it
might save."32 A variation of this argument is that the State sends the wrong message
when it kills someone as punishment for killing someone else.3 3 The legal version of these
morality-based arguments is that capital punishment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 34 although since 1976, the Supreme

27

408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).

28 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2013),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
29 See Executions By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2013),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year.
30 See Number ofExecutions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2013),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region- 1976.
" For an excellent discussion of the abolitionist arguments, see, e.g., Aliza B. Kaplan, Oregon's DeathPenalty:
The PracticalReality, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
32

See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72 (1968) (setting

forth the argument). Of course, since 9/11, there have been suggestions that in "ticking time bomb" situations,
use of torture to extract actionable information to stop an imminent attack might be justified legally, if not
morally. See e.g., Alan Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant:A Response to ProfessorStrauss, 48 N.Y.L SCH. L.

REV. 275, 277 (2003) (arguing that if torture is going to be used anyway to stop mass terrorism, it would be
preferable to regulate it through judicial torture warrants); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S

ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 172-73 (2005) (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer as saying in a Senate hearing
that "very few people in this room or in America ... would say that torture should never, ever be used,
particularly if thousands of lives are at stake").
" See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, The FailedExperiment: Last Year Only FourCountries Accountedfor Nearly All
Executions Worldwide: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 2006, at 64. In its

snarkiest form, this is a facile argument; after all, if taken seriously, it would also mean that we should neither
imprison convicted kidnappers nor fine convicted thieves. For a somewhat more sober version of the argument,
see BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (Richard Bellamy ed. 1995) ("The

death penalty is not useful because of the example of savagery it gives to men.").
34 See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only PunishmentsThat

Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 567 (2010) (summarizing arguments); John Stinneford, The
OriginalMe aning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U.L. REV.

1739, 1743 (2008).
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Court has used that clause only to narrow the pool of convicted criminals who are eligible
for the death penalty.3 5
Irrevocability: A second argument against the death penalty is that it is
irrevocable; the execution of a wrongly convicted defendant cannot be undone even if the
defendant's innocence is later established through, for example, DNA testing.36 When
former Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted all death sentences in the state shortly
before leaving office in 2003, one of his stated reasons was concern about possibly
executing an innocent person.37
Of course, society cannot replace the time that a wrongly convicted person loses
when he spends years in confinement before being exonerated. Depending on the law of
the state in which he was wrongly convicted, however, such a person might be eligible for
financial compensation. 38 Money cannot replace lost years, but it is the standard measure
of remedy for civil wrongs and can be used to compensate persons who have been
wrongly incarcerated. To a person who has been wrongly executed, however, money is no
use.
Fiscal irresponsibility: A third argument against the death penalty is that it is
fiscally irresponsible. Studies have concluded that trying a defendant for capital murder,
from start to finish, costs anywhere from $1 million to $2.5 million more than trying a
39
defendant when the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.
It may seem
counterintuitive that incarcerating a person for many more years would cost less than
putting him to death, but capital cases involve more complicated trial proceedings,
including a separate penalty phase, as well as a statutory right to appointed counsel for
post-conviction proceedings."
Of course, the fact that it costs at least $1 million more to try to execute a
murderer than to incarcerate him for life does not necessarily mean that the extra money is
wasted or destroyed. Some of the increased costs may reflect the results of judicial
resistance to capital punishment. In addition, the legal costs and fees pay for services from
defense lawyers, investigators, court reporters, and others involved in the legal system.
"See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute
persons convicted of crimes committed as minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that it
violates the Eighth Amendment to execute mentally retarded persons).
36 Since 1984, eighteen death row inmates have been exonerated
due to DNA evidence. See Innocence: List of
Those FreedFrom Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-

list-those-freed-death-row.
17 See Eric Slater, Illinois Governor Commutes All Death Row Cases; Ryan Reduces Terms of167 Inmates to
Life or 40 Years, Calling the State's CapitalPunishment System Deeply Flawed', L.A. TIMES, Jan 12, 2003, at

Al.
"

See

JIM PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE: EIGHT MYTHS THAT CONVICT THE INNOCENT 52 (2011)

(noting that slightly more than half of the states have some sort of compensation scheme for eligible wrongly
acquitted persons, including Ohio's offer of $40,330 per year plus lost wages and other costs).
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1, 14 (1995); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequencesofthe Death Penalty in

3

American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 719 (1990/1991); David Erickson, CapitalPunishment at
What Price:An Analysis ofthe Cost Issue in a Strategy to Abolish the Death Penalty 10 (1993), available at

http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/Ericksonl993COSTSTUDY.pdf; GEN'L ADMIN. OFFICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LIMITED DATA AVALABLE ON COSTS OF DEATH SENTENCES 5 (Sept. 1998), availableat

www.gao.gov/assets/220/211785.pdf (estimating cost of death sentence as 42% higher than a life sentence).
See, e.g., Judge Arthur L. Alarcon & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will ofthe Voters?: A Roadmap to
Mend or End the CaliforniaLegislature'sMulti-Billion DollarDeath PenaltyDebacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
40

S41, S65-S70 (2011) (dissecting the cost of execution in states like California and discussing whether the death
penalty is truly benefitting the public).
41 Id. at S74, S78, S93 n.187 (outlining some of the various costs).
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In a time where many law graduates have trouble finding work,4 2 perhaps we should not
be so quick to dismantle a legal architecture that provides some measure of work, albeit of
a highly stressful and specialized nature, for lawyers and others. To the extent that this
"lawyer employment" aspect of the death penalty spectacle is at all persuasive, however,
its flaw is readily apparent. If we are simply interested in providing "work" for lawyers
and we happen to have a spare $1 million lying around for such purposes, we could just as
easily hire them to dig a bunch of holes and then fill them in again. Obviously, a more
societally productive way to provide publicly-funded "lawyer employment" would be to
spend that $1 million per year on any combination of (1) paying lawyers to represent
indigent criminal defendants challenging their convictions or their non-capital sentences;
or (2) funding public interest law firms that serve the legal needs of the poor who
otherwise must proceed pro se or forego their legal claims altogether.
To be sure, not all policy decisions are structured on the results of a pure costbenefit analysis. It would be nearly impossible to quantify the value of retribution, yet
retribution remains one of the central goals of punishment.4
Uncertain deterrence: The death penalty is supposed to deter would-be killers
from carrying out their horrible crimes. 5 Even after decades of study, however, scholars
and practitioners have yet to reach a consensus about whether capital punishment actually
has a deterrent effect on potential murderers.4 6
Racial bias: A final argument is that, in the United States, the death penalty is
administered in a racially discriminatory manner and there is no effective way to eliminate
racial bias. David Baldus first confirmed the significance of the racial disparity in death
penalty cases in his exhaustive study of over 2,400 homicide cases between 1973 and
2000 in Georgia. Baldus found a race of the victim effect; that is, in murder cases with
aggravating facts, a defendant who killed a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than one who killed an African-American victim. 8 Subsequent studies
of the death penalties in other jurisdictions have found "a consistent pattern of whitevictim disparities across the systems for which [researchers had] data."49 There was,
42

See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS
(2012).

In many ways, this is not much of an exaggeration of what happens in states like Oregon, which retain and
periodically impose the death penalty, but rarely, if ever, carry out an actual execution.
44 HART, supra note 32, at 9 (defining retribution as "the application of the pains of punishment to an offender
who is morally guilty"); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 23 3-38
(1984); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Indeed, the decision that
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death").
45 See Alarcon & Mitchell, supra note 40, at S168-S169 (using a California proposition as an example of
applying more stringent penalties for felony crimes to deter would-be criminals).
43

46

See, e.g., MARK COSTANZO, JUST REVENGE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH PENALTY 103 (1997);

HART, supra note 32, at 85; Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 350 (1996) ("[N]o
proof exists that general deterrence results from capital punishment as opposed to life imprisonment."); Michael
&

L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrenceand the Death Penalty: The Views ofthe Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L.

CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996) ("[T]he death penalty does, and can do, little to reduce rates of criminal violence.").
But see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is CapitalPunishment MorallyRequired? Acts, Omissions, and

Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005) (arguing that other studies undervalue "saved" lives in
calculations purporting to show no deterrent effect).
47

See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL

ANALYSIS passim (1990).
48 See id. at 401.
49 David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discriminationin the Administration ofthe Death Penalty: An

Overview ofthe EmpiricalEvidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990Research, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 11

(2005).
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however, no statistically significant disparity based on the race of the defendant, 0 with the
exception of the United States armed forces, where race of the victim and of the defendant
had effects. 1
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 5 2 an African-American Georgia death row inmate relied
on the first Baldus study in arguing that his death sentence violated the Equal Protection
Clause.5 3 He argued that he was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than
someone who killed a black victim. 5 4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed McCleskey's
death sentence, not because of methodological flaws in the study, 5 but because the study
could not address whether McCleskey's specific jury, prosecutor, and judge were biased.5 6
The court also reasoned that "discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, [so] we
would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has
been abused." 5 7 William Stuntz concisely summarized the effect of the decision:
"McCleskey made discrimination impossible to prove."
The persuasiveness of each individual argument against the death penalty
obviously varies depending on the reader's sentiments but, collectively, the arguments are
powerful. The arguments do not, however, address the problem of what to do with
someone like Gary Haugen.

II.

GARY HAUGEN AS A CASE STUDY

In 1981, Gary Haugen brutally raped and beat his ex-girlfriend's mother to death
with fists, a hammer, and a baseball bat.5 9 Apparently, he blamed the victim for causing
the break-up of his relationship.60 Because Haugen was indigent, the trial judge appointed
a lawyer to represent him.61 Haugen pleaded guilty and received a sentence of life
imprisonment with a possibility of parole.6 2

5o Id.

David C. Baldus et al., RacialDiscriminationin the Administration ofthe DeathPenalty: The Experience
ofthe United StatesArmed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1230-3 1 (2011).
51 See

52

481 U.S. 279 (1987).

5 Id. at 291.
54 Id. at

321.

at 288-89 (noting district court's findings of methodological problems in the study and its holding
that the study "fail[ed] to contribute anything of value"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit assumed the validity of
the study but nevertheless affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas petition, and the Supreme Court
likewise did not challenge the study. Id. at 291 n.7.
5 But see id.

5

1Id. at 294.

5

1Id. at 297.

51 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 291 (2011); see also id. at 120 ("The

system as a whole may discriminate massively, but as no single decisionmaker is responsible for more than a
small fraction of the discrimination, the law holds no one accountable for it.").
59 See, e.g., Helen Jung, Gary Haugen, Death Row Inmate in Limbo After Oregon'sExecution Ban, Religion,

HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/10/gary-haugen-oregon-executionban_n_1140197.html; see also Natalie Brand, Family ofHaugen'sFirstMurder Victim Speaks Out, KPTV Fox

12 NEWS, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.kptv.com/story/16140959/family-of-haugens-first-murder-victim-speaksout.
60 See, e.g., Natalie Brand, Family ofHaugen 's FirstMurder Victim
Speaks Out, KPTV Fox 12 NEWS, Nov. 28,

2011, http://www.kptv.com/story/16140959/family-of-haugens-first-murder-victim-speaks-out.
61 See Helen Jung, Death Row Inmate GaryHaugen Gets Wish for New
Attorney as MentalEvaluationAwaits,

OREGONIAN, July 15, 2011.
62 Jung, supra note 59; Under current Oregon law, murder that does not rise to
the level of aggravated murder
(which is a death-eligible crime) carries a sentence of life imprisonment, except that after 25 years of

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013

7

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
172

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

On September 2, 2003, Haugen and Jason Van Brumwell killed David Shane
Polin, their fellow inmate at the Oregon State Penitentiary, by stabbing him 84 times and
63
smashing his head with a chair. Haugen and Brumwell believed, incorrectly as it turned
out, that Polin was an informant who had reported illegal drug use by inmates to prison
authorities so that drug tests could be administered in time to test positive.6 4
Haugen and Brumwell were each charged with aggravated murder, which carried
65
a potential death sentence under Oregon law. There were 18 statutory factors that
66
qualified a homicide as an aggravated murder. Polin's killing satisfied two of those
factors: Haugen and Brumwell (a) were convicted murderers at the time of the killing67
and (b) committed the homicide while in prison.68 Both inmates were convicted and
sentenced to death.6 9
After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence,
Haugen wanted to waive his remaining post-conviction challenges. 70 His appointed
lawyers, however, moved to have Haugen declared incompetent to waive those rights-at
least, in the absence of a psychiatric evaluation-setting up a client-lawyer conflict.7 1 In
response, Haugen sent his own letter to the judge indicating that he wanted to fire his
appointed lawyers.7 2 The trial judge discussed the matter with Haugen directly and
73
concluded that Haugen was competent to proceed pro se. Haugen's former lawyers were
appointed as standby counsel to assist him if he so desired.
At this point, the non-profit organization Oregon Capital Resource Center got
involved in the matter.7 5 The Center sought review of the trial court's decision allowing
Haugen to fire his lawyers "without a sufficient inquiry into Haugen's competence."76 The
State and Haugen both objected but the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge
had failed to follow the required procedures in capital cases.

confinement, the inmate can petition to have the sentence changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(5) (2011). The law in effect at the time Haugen was convicted, however,
provided for more lenient parole. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(3) (1979).
63 State v. Haugen, 349 P.3d 174, 176-78
(Or. 2010).
64

6

Id. at 178-79.
1Id. at 176.

66
67
61

See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095.
See id. § 163.095(1)(c).
See id. § 163.095(2)(b).

69

State v. Haugen, 349 P.3d 174, 176 (Or. 2010).

70

State v. Haugen, 266 P.3d 68, 70-71 (Or. 2011) [hereinafter Haugen Il].

" Id. at 71. See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representationsofthe Unabomber, 24 VT. L.
REV. 417, 497 (2000), for an account of the conflicts between lawyer and client when the lawyer sees the
overriding priority as avoiding the death penalty, but the client is willing to accept the possibility of a death
sentence in exchange for litigating guilt.
72 Haugen II, 266 P.3d at 71. Although conventional wisdom suggests that "a lawyer
who represents himself has
a fool for a client," an observation that would seem even truer when the client is not a lawyer, Farettav.
Calforniaheld that the government cannot force an unwilling criminal defendant to be represented by an
attorney. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
" Haugen II, 266 P.3d at 71.
74 Id.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
7 See id. at 72 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 137.464 (West 2009), which calls for an evaluation of the
defendant's competency by the state Health Authority where "the court has substantial reason to believe that, due
7

76
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The matter returned to the trial court, which, on Haugen's request, appointed
substitute counsel due to Haugen's allegation of a broken attorney-client relationship.
Haugen's originally appointed lawyers challenged their removal but were unsuccessful.71
Substitute counsel supported Haugen's bid to waive his remaining appeals by
having a new psychiatrist perform a mental competency examination.s The new doctor
concluded that Haugen was competent to waive his rights and so testified." During a
hearing on the matter, substitute counsel offered no contradicting evidence such as the
opinion of the previous doctor who examined Haugen and concluded that he was not
812
83
competent. Following this hearing, the trial court found that Haugen was competent.8
OCRC then filed another motion, asking the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court
essentially to reverse the trial court's decision. By a 4-3 vote, the Oregon Supreme Court
denied the request, thus apparently clearing the way for the state to execute Haugen." The
trial judge set an execution date of December 6, 2011.86
On November 22, 2011, Governor John Kitzhaber acted on a request by various
anti-capital punishment groups to stop Haugen's execution by granting a "temporary
reprieve" for the "duration of term in office" on the grounds that the death penalty in
Oregon was expensive, flawed, and broken:
It is a perversion of justice that the single best indicator of who will and
will not be executed has nothing to do with the circumstances of a crime
or the findings of a jury. The only factor that determines whether
someone sentenced to death in Oregon is actually executed is that they
volunteer. 7
Governor Kitzhaber did not, however, commute Haugen's sentence to life imprisonment.
Initially, Haugen seemed pleased with the reprieve, saying that it was a victory
for him.8 Soon after, however, Haugen changed his view: "I'm in . .. limbo. . . . I didn't
ask for this. I'm ready to go." 90 Perhaps Haugen was disappointed that he was still being

to mental incapacity, the defendant cannot engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and options" to be
exercised at a death warrant hearing).
" Id. at 73.
79 Id.
go

81

Id.

Id.

82 Id.

83Id.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 79.
See Death Warrant, State v. Haugen, No. 04C46224, Nov. 18, 2011 (copy on file with author).
1

Press Release, Governor KitzhaberIssues Reprieve - Callsfor Action on CapitalPunishment(Nov. 22, 2011),

http://www.oregon.gov/gov/media room/pages/pressreleasesp201 1/press_1 12211 .aspx. The canceled execution
had already cost the state over $57,000 in preparation expenses. Helen Jung, State Spent $1.3 Million on
Lawyers, Drugs and Preparationfor Cancelled Execution, OREGONIAN (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/12/statespent_13_million on lawy.html.
Press Release, supra note 88 ("I did not [commute] because the policy of this state on capital punishment is
not mine alone to decide. It is a matter for all Oregonians to decide."). Technically, the Governor issued a
moratorium on all executions, not just Haugen's.
8

89 Helen Jung, John Kitzhaber Moratorium on Death PenaltyLeaves Inmate Gary Haugen and Oregon

lawmakers Wondering What's Next, OREGONIAN (Nov. 24, 2011) http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-

news/index.ssf/2011/12/kitzhaber moratorium on death.html.
90 Id.
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imprisoned in death row conditions. Not long after, Haugen found a new lawyer to
challenge the validity of the reprieve. 91
At this point, it is worth noting that Haugen's complaint is not devoid of support.
If Governor Kitzhaber were to change his mind and lift the reprieve, or if his successor
were to lift the reprieve, then Haugen would again face the possibility of execution. While
it may seem counterintuitive to see any harm in delaying a death row inmate's
execution-as the alternative would be to speed up the execution process-the European
Court of Human Rights, among other courts and jurists, has recognized that prolonged
stays on death row while awaiting execution can give rise to something known as "death
row phenomenon."92 According to the European Court of Human Rights, an inmate who
has "to endure for many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mounting
tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death" would be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment. 9 3
Haugen's new lawyer successfully argued that, under Oregon law, a valid
reprieve-as distinguished from an outright commutation or pardon-required acceptance
by the inmate; because Haugen refused to accept the reprieve, it could not block the
execution. 9 4 At this point, the Governor could have abandoned the fight and let Haugen
proceed to be executed, or could have exercised his plenary power to commute Haugen's
punishment to a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 9 5 Instead, Governor
Kitzhaber doubled down and appealed the trial court's ruling.96 In other words, Oregon
taxpayers have had and continue to have the privilege of paying for Gary Haugen's lawyer
to argue that he should be executed, and for the state's lawyers to argue that he should not
be executed-completely backwards from the normal spectacle.
Of course, taxpayers are used to funding both sides of litigation in criminal cases
involving indigent defendants but, generally, the lawyer representing the state (i.e., the
prosecutor) is seeking to impose punishment, and the lawyer for the defendant is seeking
to avoid punishment. The taxpayers' obligation to pay for the defense lawyer is a
necessary consequence of the Sixth Amendment. 9 7 In a situation like Haugen's, however,
the taxpayers are paying for the defense lawyer to argue in favor of letting the state do
what the state prison officials are ready to do, while also paying for the state lawyers to
interfere with the state itself.

91 See Haugen II,
92

266 P.3d 68, 79 (Or. 2011).
Soeringv. United Kingdom, Ser. A, No. 161, 11 EUR. HUM. RTS. RPTR. 439, 476 (1989).

93 Id.; see also Barbara Ward, Competencyfor Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.

REv. 35, 38 (1986) (citing sources of distress); Singhv. Punjab, (1980)2 S.C.R. 582, 582-83 (India)
(recognizing death row phenomenon as basis for commuting death sentence to life imprisonment); Vatheeswaran
v. TamilNadu, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 348, 360 (India) (also recognizing death row phenomenon as basis for
commuting death sentence to life imprisonment).
94 See, e.g., Letter from Harrison Latto, attorney for Gary Haugen, to the Hon. John Kitzhaber, Governor of Or.,
regarding Gary D. Haugen (Mar. 12, 2012) (on file with author); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-62
(1833); Helen Jung, GaryHaugen Reprieve Challenge:Judge Appears Receptive to Death Row Inmate's

Argument, OREGONIAN (July 24, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnew s/index.ssf/2012/07/garyhaugen reprieve challenge.html.
95 See Arthur B. LaFrance, Op-Ed., CapitalPunishment in Oregon Kitzhaber Should Commute All Death

Sentences, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27, 2011, availableat 2011 WLNR 24583894.
96

Helen Jung, Gov. Kitzhaber Appeals Decision in GaryHaugen Execution Case,
OREGONIAN (Sept. 11, 2012,

3:05 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/09/gov
kitzhaber appeals_decision.html.
9

See OR. REv. STAT. §135.055 (1979); Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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PRISON KILLERS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THEM?

Haugen's case presents an unusual but not unique situation that is largely
overlooked by the conventional death penalty debate-what should be done with a prison
inmate serving a life sentence who murders another inmate (or a prison guard)? Prison
homicides by inmates are relatively rare, as one would expect given that violent criminals
are typically housed in maximum-security facilities and under the watch of prison
guards.98 Yet, they are not unheard of. Polin was the fifth prisoner killed by another
prisoner in the Oregon State Penitentiary between 1986 and 2004.99 Nationwide, prisoner
deaths due to homicide have remained relatively stable at low but non-trivial levels,
around 1-2 percent of all prisoner deaths. 100 In absolute numbers, from 2001 to 2007, over
500 prisoners were murdered in state or local prisons orjails-about 70 per year. 101
The government obviously owes a duty to protect imprisoned inmates from
known harms;102 according to the Supreme Court, it is "cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions,"103 including where those unsafe conditions
arise from violence inflicted by other inmates. 104 In fact, in Helling v. McKinney, the Court
even concluded that a non-smoking inmate could proceed to a trial on his lawsuit alleging
that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to share a jail
cell with a smoker; o0 to prevail ultimately, he would need to prove that he was being
exposed to levels of secondhand smoke that "pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage
to his future health," as well as "deliberate indifference" to that risk by prison officials.106
It is important to keep in mind that the danger the inmate was exposed to in
McKinney was not a present harm but a future one.107 The secondhand smoke might or
might not have caused cancer or other health problems down the road, but it was not the
same as, say, exposed electrical wiring,1os where any injury would be immediate. A prison

98See

MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239911, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE

PRISONS, 2000-2010- STATISTICAL TABLES (Dec. 2012).

99 See Joseph Rose, Inmates Charged With Murder in Convict'sBeating Death, OREGONIAN, June 16, 2004, at
D10.
'0o

See NOONAN, supra note 99.

101

Id.

Whatever else we may think about convicted felons, we have not yet descended to the point of dumping them
into prison, slamming the door shut, and leaving them in something like the anarchistic and despotic fiefdoms
depicted in movies like ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1981) and NO ESCAPE (Columbia
Pictures 1994).
'0' Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).
104 See, e.g., LaMarcav. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993); Youngv.
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 361-62
(3d Cir. 1992); Cortes-Quinonesv. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988); Rolandv. Johnson,
856 F.2d 764, 769 (6th Cir. 1988); Gokav. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1988); Pressly v. Hutto, 816
F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987); Morganv. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987)LVillante v.
Dep't of Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986); Albertiv. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir.
1986); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); Martinv. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984);
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980).
102

'0' Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); cf Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of CorrectionalOfficials
in Responding to the Incidence ofthe HIV Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.

CONFINEMENT 45, 94 (1995) (arguing that prison officials might have "a duty to segregate inmates who are
highly contagious for one or more of the opportunistic infections which are associated with [HIV]").
'0' McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In the end, McKinney's
case became moot when the Nevada prison instituted a smoking ban. See Bob Twigg, Smoke-Free Trend Enters
Prison, Jails,USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1996, at 04A.
1'0 McKinney, 509 U.S. at 33 ("That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel
proposition").

'o' See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974).
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inmate who demonstrates the capability and willingness to murder another inmate might
not pose an immediate danger to any other inmate, but may well pose some future danger
to all other inmates.
At the time that he killed Polin, Haugen was potentially eligible for parole. 109 The
possibility of additional prison time (that is, a life sentence with no possibility of parole)
or even the death sentence obviously did not deter him from committing his second
murder.110 Haugen's own statements to other inmates confirm as much, because he said a
few days prior to the murder, "he was getting ready to do something kind of - kind of
foolish and that he was probably getting more time and that we wouldn't be seeing
him."111 In other words, Haugen was aware that there could be severe consequences for
killing Polin, yet he went ahead and did so anyway.112
More importantly, there is no reason to be confident that he would not kill
another inmate in the future for similar reasons. Punishing Haugen for murdering David
Polin isn't only about deterrence or retribution. Incapacitation is one of the purposes of
punishment.113 Incarceration of a convicted felon sufficiently incapacitates him from
further harming society (assuming that escape from prison is not feasible), so any
additional incapacitation from executing the inmate would be marginal-so long as we are
talking about society. From the standpoint of other inmates, there is a world of difference
between imprisonment and execution when it comes to incapacitating a fellow inmate.
The Oregon State Penitentiary has thus far protected the rest of us from Gary Haugen, but
it failed to protect David Polin.
Executing a prison inmate murderer like Haugen would thus protect other
inmates, as it would remove the source of the threat. Sentencing a convicted prison inmate
murderer but refraining from actually carrying out the execution falls short of providing
absolute protection to other inmates. It does, however, provide a greater measure of
protection than leaving the murdering inmate in the general prison population. Generally,
conditions of confinement on death row are fairly restrictive.
One typical death row
regime consisted of (1) a cell measuring approximately 9 feet by 7 feet; (2) just 6 to 7 1/2
hours of recreation per week; (3) limited visits to the law library or infirmary; (4) one hour
per day out of the cell in a common area; and (5) handcuffing and shackling when
prisoners move around the prison.
Even so, such restrictive conditions do not reduce the
risk of intra-inmate killings to zero.116 The federal Florence Supermax facility, for
example, has seen two inmates murdered.1 1 7 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has admitted that

'09

State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31, 47 n.15 (Or. 2010).

10

Id. at 35 n.4.

1

Id.

112

Id. at 34.

See, e.g., 1 WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, 38 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining theories of punishment, specifically incapacitation).
113

114

See generally Dave Mann, Solitary Men, TEXAS OBSERVER, Nov. 10, 2010, at 6.

...
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 459 (1989) (describing conditions in
a Virginia penitentiary); see also Tracy Hresko, In the Cellarsofthe Hollow Men: Use ofSolitary Confinement
in U.S. Prisonsand Its Implications Under InternationalLaws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 8-10

(2006) (describing conditions of solitary confinement).
116

See, e.g., Death PenaltySought in Supermax Killings, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, (Mar. 29, 2011),

http://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2011/03/29/Death-penalty-sought-in-Supermax-killings/UPI73571301420385/.
117

Id.
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"[w]e know from cases in this court involving murders by prisoners in the control units of
federal prisons . . . that such units cannot be made totally secure." 1
Restrictive confinement conditions might therefore be seen as a viable though
imperfect alternative to the death penalty if the primary concern is protecting other
inmates. Yet, things are not so simple.
For one example of a high-profile convicted defendant sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment under extremely restrictive conditions and criticism thereof, one can look at
the case of Ramzi Yousef.119 Convicted in 1996 for leading the "Bojinka plot," an
audacious but unsuccessful attempt to bomb eleven Transpacific flights simultaneously,
and in 1997 for leading the truck bomb attack against the World Trade Center in 1993,
Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first crime and 240 years imprisonment
for the second.120 Although the decisions regarding where to imprison a defendant, and
under what conditions, are typically made by the Bureau of Prisons, district judges are free
to make recommendations and, in Yousef's case, Judge Duffy said in open court:
I recommend that your visitors' list be restricted to your attorneys. The
prison should not permit friends, gawkers or media reporters to visit
with you. While normally a prisoner in administrative detention might
have some visitors from his family, in your case I would expect the
prison to require proof positive that one is in fact a member of your
family. We don't even know what your real name is. You have used a
dozen aliases. Having abandoned your family name, I must assume that
you have abandoned your family also.
The restrictions I am imposing are undoubtedly harsh. They amount to
solitary confinement for life. . . . Your treatment will be no different
than that accorded to a person with a virus which, if loosed, could cause
plague and pestilence throughout the world. 1 2 1
The Bureau of Prisons incarcerated Yousef at the federal Florence Supermax
facility in Colorado under conditions similar to those endured by death row inmates: 23
hours a day in a small cell, with soundproofing to prevent inmates from communicating
with one another; one hour of exercise with "feet shackled together and his every move
watched by at least two prison guards"; and "until December 1998[,] . . . no human
contact other than that of the omnipresent guards."122 To be sure, the special
administrative measures were imposed on Yousef not merely because of the concern that
he might attack others, but also due to the belief that he might be able to incite other

"

United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2000).

See generally Yousef 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (extensively detailing convictions relating to 1993 World
Trade Center bombing and an unsuccessful plot to bomb multiple airlines simultaneously); see, e.g., SIMON
119

REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS: RAMZI YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN, AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM 23 9-43

(1999).
120
121

See, e.g., REEVE, supra note 120, at 23 8-43.
Id. at 243.

122 Id. at 253. Interestingly, until 2009, Yousef had reportedly never left his cell,
because he refused to submit to
the strip search that would precede his daily hour of recreation. 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version ofHell
(CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 2007, updated June 19, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/210018560_162-3357727.html (quoting former Supermax warden Robert Hood). Hood's account is contradicted by
investigative journalist Simon Reeve, who reported that Yousef, after getting his confinement conditions relaxed,
struck up a friendship of sorts with Ted Kaczinski (the Unabomber). REEVE, supra note 120, at 253-54.
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prisoners if he were allowed to talk to them, or to pass messages to terrorists through
visitors. 123

Yousef's confinement conditions drew criticism from a variety of sources. Stuart
Grassian, a Harvard Medical School psychiatrist, argued that solitary confinement is "a
124
kind of mental torture. . . . The sensory deprivation causes enormous psychological
suffering and mental illness."125 Harvard law professor Philip Heymann, a former Deputy
U.S. Attorney General, opined that long-term solitary confinement raised "substantial
issue[s] of cruel and unusual punishment."126 Amnesty International began to investigate
Yousef's situation, which was possibly the catalyst that led the Bureau of Prisons to relax
the confinement conditions slightly.127 Even today, an attorney representing Yousef is
trying to get a court to further relax the confinement conditions.128
No court has gone so far as to hold that solitary confinement is necessarily cruel
and unusual punishment, but the issue has not been presented squarely concerning
permanent solitary confinement.129 In Wolff v. McDonnell,130 Justice Douglas disagreed
with the majority's holding regarding the amount of process due to a prisoner before being
placed in solitary confinement; whereas the majority held that the prisoner need not be
afforded an opportunity to confront accusers or to engage in cross-examination,131
Douglas believed that the consequences of solitary confinement were so significant that
,,132
the prisoner was entitled to those rights "absent any special overriding considerations.
Interestingly, despite acknowledging that solitary confinement can last "months or even
years," Douglas did not indicate any substantive opposition to solitary confinement.133
In Hutto v. Finney,1 3 4 prisoners had won injunctive relief that limited their
solitary confinement to 30 days.135 Prison officials argued that the district court had
REEVE, supra note 120, at 252-54; see also United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 354-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (demonstrating the possibility of communicating through visitors). Sattar demonstrated that this concern
was not mere fantasy. In Sattar, the defense lawyer for Omar Abdul-Rahman (aka the Blind Sheikh), the spiritual
inspiration for the 1993 WTC attack, brought her translator to see her client during post-conviction meetings, but
instead of translating her conversation with Abdul-Rahman, the translator spoke directly, bringing messages
from the outside, and ultimately delivering a message from Abdul-Rahman to his overseas followers. The
lawyer, Lynne Stewart, and the translator were both convicted of providing material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization by providing personnel in the form of Abdul-Rahman. Id.
123

124 REEVE, supra note 120, at
253.

Id. at 253-54. A former inmate at the Florence Supermax facility said that solitary confinement there "breaks
down the human spirit. It breaks down the human psyche. It breaks your mind." 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean
Version ofHell, supra note 123. No commentator objects to solitary confinement, however. Cf David McCord,
125

ImaginingA RetributivistAlternativeto CapitalPunishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 121-31 (1998) (arguing for

imprisoning aggravated murderers in permanent solitary confinement, with full sensory deprivation on the
birthday of the victims).
126 REEVE, supra note 120, at 254.
127 Id. at 253-54 (noting that prison officials apparently permitted Yousef to interact with fellow inmates
Kaczynski and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh).

128 See Larry Neumister, Lawyer Seeks to Ease Conditionsfor '93 WTC Bomber, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 22, 2012

4:26 PM), http://origin.bigstory.ap.org/article/lawyer-seeks-ease-conditions-93-wtc-bomber.
129 Angela A. Allen-Bell, PerceptionProfiling & ProlongedSolitary Confinement Viewed Through the Lens of

the Angola 3 Case: When Prison Officials Become Judges, JudgesBecome Visually Challenged, and Justice
Becomes Legally Blind, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 763, 770-72 (2012).
'3

418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 567.

132

Id. at 595-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

133

Id. at 593-94.

134

437 U.S. 678 (1978).

13

Id. at 678.
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erroneously ruled that indefinite solitary confinement was necessarily cruel and unusual
punishment, but the Court held that the prison official's argument was based on a
misreading of the lower court's decision:
Read in its entirety, the District Court's opinion makes it abundantly
clear that the length of isolation sentences was not considered in a
vacuum. In the court's words, punitive isolation "is not necessarily
unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the duration of the
confinement and the conditions thereof."

It is equally plain, however, that the length of confinement cannot be
ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of "grue" might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.136
Note the Court's recognition that the duration of solitary confinement is an
important factor to consider in assessing its validity. Similarly, in United States v.
Johnson, Judge Posner opined that:
A prison's control unit is not intended as a punishment for the crime that
got the prisoner into prison in the first place, like a sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor. Its purpose rather is to deter and prevent
violations of prison disciplinary rules and to protect prisoners, guards,
and in some cases people outside the prison, or the society at large,
against dangerous conduct by the prisoner. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.40(a)
("in an effort to maintain a safe and orderly environment within its
institutions, the Bureau of Prisons operates control unit programs
intended to place into a separate unit those inmates who are unable to
function in a less restrictive environment without being a threat to others
or to the orderly operation of the institution"). 13 7
The court examined applicable prison regulations requiring a warden to conduct a
risk assessment before imposing any special administrative measures, including solitary
confinement, on a disruptive or dangerous inmate, and to review the risk assessment no
more than 120 days later. 138 Based on these regulations, the court concluded that '[t]he
limitations in these regulations imply that the Bureau of Prisons could not assign a
prisoner directly upon his admission to the federal prison system to spend the rest of his
139
life in the control unit without the possibility of reconsideration."
Because Johnson'sholding was based on the court's interpretation of the relevant
statutes and regulations, 140 it does not directly address whether the government could, in
fact, impose indefinite (i.e., life-long) solitary confinement as a punishment for lifers
convicted of committing another murder while imprisoned.

136

Id. at 685-87.
United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 672 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c) (1997)).

139 Id ("The regulation requiring the bureau to review an inmate's control unit status 'at least once every 60 to 90
days . . . to determine the inmate's readiness for release from the [Control] Unit,' 28 C.F.R. § 541.49(d), points
in the same direction.").
140 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 501.3(a), 501.3(c), 541.49(d)
(1995)).
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As noted earlier, legal and medical experts raised concerns about convicted
terrorist Ramzi Yousef's extremely harsh conditions of confinement.1 4 1 Though these
conditions were nearly unique, empirical studies of prisoners in general solitary
confinement have identified severe psychological and physiological harms that can afflict
the confined prisoners with greater frequency than seen in the general prison
population.142 Symptoms include "anger, hatred, bitterness, boredom, stress, loss of the
sense of reality, suicidal thoughts, trouble sleeping, impaired concentration, confusion,
depression, and hallucinations."143 Other studies have found that six months of solitary
confinement can cause brain impairment on par with someone who has "incurred [
traumatic injury."
Not surprisingly, these negative effects have led many to argue that long-term
solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, or even torture. * One
commentator notes that there is a trend in European countries toward reduced use of
solitary confinement, with greater safeguards such as daily physical and mental
evaluations by physicians.146 European prison rules do not impose hard and fast limits on
the duration of solitary confinement, but they do allow it "only in exceptional cases and
for a specified period of time, which shall be as short as possible."
Other commentators recommend limiting the maximum duration of solitary
confinement to no more than two years (absent extraordinary circumstances) or less,
and importantly, offering the prisoner an opportunity to demonstrate an ability to behave
in controlled settings and thus earn his way out of solitary confinement.149 Atul Gawande,
a medical school doctor, further argues that solitary confinement does not lead to
predictable reduction in prison violence because much prison violence stems from
overcrowding and conditions that "maximize[] humiliation and confrontation";15 0 he
points to England's experience in greatly reducing the number of prisoners in isolation by
improving their conditions of confinement. 151
141 See REEVE, supra note 120, at 251-54 (citing Sharon Walsh, 'Proud'Terrorist
Gets 240 Years in N.Y.
Bombing, WASH. POST, Jan. 9,1998, at A01).
142 Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects ofSolitary Confinement on PrisonInmates:
A BriefHistory and Review of
the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 476 (2006).

143 Id. at 488; see also Bryan B. Walton, The Eighth AmendmentAnd PsychologicalImplications ofSolitary

Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 277-81 (1997) (more summary of psychological effects); Craig
Haney & Mona Lynch, RegulatingPrisonsofthe Future:A PsychologicalAnalysis ofSupermax and Solitary
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 515-25 (1997).
144 See Atul Gawande, Hellhole: The UnitedStates Holds Tens ofThousands ofInmates in Long-Term Solitary

Confinement. Is This Torture?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2009),

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa fact gawande#ixzz2AC9MaBCq.
145 See Haney & Lynch, supra note 145, at 542-54; Tracy Hresko, In the Cellarsofthe Hollow Men: Use of
Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisonsand Its Implications Under InternationalLaws Against Torture, 18 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 1, 21-24 (2006).
146 Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and InternationalHuman Rights:
Why the U.S. PrisonSystem

Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 93-95 (2005); Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation
Rec(2006)2 ofthe Comm. ofMinisters to States on the EuropeanPrisonRules, R. 43.2,
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDocjsp?id=955747.
147 Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation Rec(2006)2 ofthe Comm. ofMinisters to States on the European Prison
Rules, R. 60.5,

https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDocjsp?id=955747&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFB
B55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75#P6_138.
148

Haney & Lynch supra note 145, at 561; see also Hresko, supra note 147, at 25.

149

Jules Lobel, ProlongedSolitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 132 (2008).

"0 Gawande, supra note 146.
SId.
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The problem is that none of these suggestions that call for limiting or minimizing
the use of solitary confinement actually address how to deal with an inmate like Gary
Haugen. Over twenty years passed between when Haugen killed his first victim and when
he killed David Polin. 152 Given an opportunity to show that he can "behave," he might be
well able to do so simply to get out of solitary confinement. Once released back into the
general population, who can say what he might do to the next inmate he were to suspect of
being an informant? 15 3
To be sure, the situation might be more complicated than it appears. Those
twenty years of prison leading up to the day of Polin's killing may have hardened Haugen
to the point that he became capable of doing something he otherwise wouldn't have
done.1 5 4 It may be that using smuggled drugs was the only way Haugen felt he could cope
with enduring his life sentence, and that he believed it was necessary to stop Polin from
informing on him. If so, the prison system could be seen as partially responsible for
causing him to act the way he did. Still, even if one were to imagine a counterfactual in
which the Oregon State Penitentiary implemented the improved prison conditions with
which Britain found success, there would be no certainty that Haugen would not have
killed Polin. The number of British prisoners in isolation is not zero.15 5 Given that Haugen
premeditated Polin's murder with the purpose of silencing a person that he believed was
an informant, not someone who he felt unable to avoid a confrontation with, it seems
questionable whether anything would have kept Haugen from killing Polin.156 This
argument is not to suggest that it would be a bad idea to experiment with improving
conditions of confinement to determine whether less restrictive conditions reduce prison
violence; it is only to say that we may at best reduce-but not eliminate-prison murders.
Ultimately, prison killers such as Gary Haugen highlight a three-way conflict
among the goals of (1) eliminating the death penalty; (2) avoiding secure but restrictive
prison conditions that demonstrably harm prisoners mentally as well as physically; and (3)
protecting inmates from violence inflicted by other prisoners. Much as the push to reduce
false positives will invariably result in an increase in false negatives, here too success in
one or two goals will negatively impact the remaining goal. If the choice is between
inflicting some unavoidable harm on an inmate murderer, or imposing substantial risk of
harm on other inmates at the hands of that inmate murderer, it may be normatively just to
choose the former: the harm is simply a by-product of the goal of protecting other
15
inmates. 1
If this reasoning is seen as unacceptable, it may be tempting to conclude that
what we need is "outside the box" thinking. While it would be foolish to assert that no
152

Haugen, 243 P.3d 31, 34-35 (Or. 2010).

153 Some "restorativists" may conclude that no one is beyond rehabilitation and redemption with appropriate
treatment. See, e.g., BIBAS, supranote 1, at 99 (discussing how some extreme restorativists believe that crime
victims can be "healed by a cathartic conference, apology, and restitution," and by implication, that the criminals
will present no more threat). In Haugen's case, of course, his victim could not be part of such a conference, since
he's dead. More to the point, I suspect that the other inmates - and their relatives - would probably find little
reassurance in any claimed rehabilitation of an inmate murderer.

154

Cf JAMES

Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL

PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN

AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (contrasting the harsh conditions of American prisons with the more lenient

conditions in continental European prisons).
. Gawande, supranote 146.
116

Haugen, 243 P.3d at 35.

This is, of course, a variation of the typical deterrence-based debate about the death penalty: can capital
punishment be justified if it is shown to save lives of future murder victims by deterring their would-be killers?
One challenge is that the harm inflicted on the inmate is immediate and tangible (death), whereas the "saved"
victims are speculative and unknown/unknowable.
15.
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solution is possible, a brief review of some fictional high-tech proposals depicted in
movies suggests that technology is unlikely to be a neat savior.
Implanted pain/control devices: In the science-fiction thriller Fortress,
prisoners in a maximum-security prison facility are forced to swallow an "intestinator,"
which is a device that causes instantly disabling stomach pain upon command of the everwatchful computer system. 1 5 9 The nearest analogue in today's world would be "stun
belts," which are devices that can deliver approximately 50,000 volts in an eight-second
jolt to paralyze the wearer temporarily.160 Courts have generally upheld the use of stun
belts as an alternative to physical restraints of potentially dangerous prisoners during court
proceedings.161 Challenges to use of the belts, however, have focused on the prejudicial
impact at trial of being forced to wear the belt, and not the pain inflicted.162 As with
solitary confinement, a shorter duration of being forced to wear a stun belt-such as
during court proceedings-may be tolerable, whereas a permanent requirement to do so
may be inhumane. In any event, it is far from clear that the stun belt is an improvement,
especially given that accidental triggerings, while rare, are not unheard of.163 Even a low
rate of accidental triggerings would result in a substantial number of unintended shocks
over a 20-year period.164
165

Long-term freeze: In the world of Demolition Man, prisoners are sentenced to
the CryoPrison, where they are "frozen" (i.e., placed in suspended animation) to be
thawed out at the end of their prison term.166 Presumably, the advantage of this approach
is that the prisoner is incapacitated for the duration of the sentence, unable to harm anyone
else, but without suffering from the harmful effects of solitary confinement.
Cryonics is currently far from being a viable and reliable procedure,167 but
perhaps it can be developed into one. Speculation about its effects raises concerns that it
both fails to exact adequate punishment, and yet may also be cruel and unusual in its own
way. 16 If indeed the prisoner is frozen for 30 years and then is thawed, and feels no
passage of time, then it is somewhat hard to see the retributive value of punishment. On
the other hand, the world will have changed in 30 years, and family and friends will have
aged or even died, perhaps leaving the prisoner feeling isolate and alone.169 It's also worth
noting that, in the movie at least, Sylvester Stallone's character (who had been frozen as
part of a prison sentence) reported that he in fact did experience the passage of time,
See, e.g., FORTRESS (Dimension Films 1993).

id.
See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
See, e.g., Gonzalezv . Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2003).

159 See
160
161

Cf Comment, The REACT Security Belt: Stunning Prisonersand Human Rights Groups into
Questioning
Whether Its Use Is Permissible Under the United States and Texas Constitutions,30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 242162

243, 246-247 (1998) ("[A]ctivation of the belt causes immediate immobilization and may result in defecation
and urination.. . . [T]he belt's metal prongs may leave welts on the victim's skin ... [requiring] as long as six
months to heal").
163 Durham, 219 F. Supp. 2d
at 1238.
164
16'

Id. at 1239.
DEMOLITION MAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993); see also MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corporation 2002).
166
167

DEMOLITION MAN, supra note 167.
See Ryan Sullivan, Pre-Mortem Cryopreservation:Recognizing a Patient'sRight to Die in Order to Live, 14

QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 49, 60-70 (2010) (recapping the current state of cryonics).
161

See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 829, 861-63, 886 (2002).

See ALIENS (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1986) (considering the isolation that Ellen Ripley, who
was not a prisoner, felt upon discovering that she spent 57 years in cryogenic sleep).
169
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making the entire experience sound like solitary confinement combined with sensory
deprivation.1 7 0 This, too, seems an unpromising alternative to conventional solitary
confinement.
Concentration of the dangerousprisoners in one location: In the movies
From New York and No Escape,1 7 1 society has essentially given up on managing
for extremely dangerous prisoners.172 The prisoners are instead dumped onto
islands with no guards and no rules other than any prisoners attempting to escape
fired upon.173 Within the island, however, it is survival of the fittest.1 7 4

Escape
prisons
savage
will be

Although the federal prison on Alcatraz Island in the San Francisco Bay held
dangerous inmates,
much as the current federal Supermax facility in Florence,
Colorado, does, our society has not abandoned the idea of managing the prisoners and
attempting at least to prevent them from being able to run their own fiefdoms based upon
the rule of the strongest. The obvious flaw in this approach is that we would be forsaking
our duty to protect inmates from foreseeable harm. About the only thing that could be said
to justify such an approach would be to depersonalize the inmates on the theory that
anyone put into such a situation would necessarily be someone like Haugen. This too does
not seem like a good idea.
Metal boots with magnetizablefloor: In Face/Off176 society has built a high-tech
prison called Erehwon (read it backwards) where inmates are forced to wear metal boots
at all times.
This way, if there is a riot or other physical disturbance, prison officials can
activate powerful magnets in the floor, thus immobilizing all prisoners.
The movie
itself, however, demonstrates that these boots are likely insufficient to prevent an inmate
from killing another inmate, either before they can be activated, or if the victim is still
within grabbing/punching distance. 1 79
Behavioral modification: In A Clockwork Orange,1s a violent young man is
arrested after a vicious crime spree that includes beating a man and raping his wife, and
beating another woman to death.
After receiving a lengthy prison sentence, he agrees to
volunteer for an experiment in rehabilitating criminals by modifying their behavior. 18 2 The
procedure consists of forcing him to watch violent movies while being fed drugs that
induce severe nausea.183 Subsequently, violent impulses trigger feelings of nausea.

17o
171
172

See DEMOLITION MAN, supranote 167.
ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1981); NO ESCAPE (Columbia Pictures 1994).
id

173 Id.
174 One could also look to the third season of the television serialized drama Prison
Break, in which the main
character found himself in a fictional Panamanian prison run by the inmates, with the guards outside the facility
entirely and charged with keeping anyone from escaping. Prison Break (Fox 2005).
17' Haney, supra note 145, at 488.
176

FACE/OFF (Paramount 1997).

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

See id.

"s A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Bros. 1971).
181

Id.

182

id

13

Id.

184

id
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Assuming that such behavioral modification could work, it would raise a host of
issues not dissimilar to those involved in chemical castration: use of "mind-altering
drug[s] purely for purposes of incapacitation (as opposed to medical treatment)."" If
solitary confinement raises concerns because of its effect on the mental health of
prisoners, it is difficult to see how the use of mind-altering drugs to change behavior
would be an improvement.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Gary Haugen saga is without doubt unusual, but it does highlight the fiscal
insanity of the current death penalty situation-especially in a state like Oregon, which
does not execute death row inmates unless they volunteer for it (and for now, under the
present Governor, not even then). One can easily imagine more societally productive uses
of the money that Oregon has poured into this case since Haugen was convicted of killing
David Polin, and yet, without the death penalty, one must wonder, who would be the next
David Polin?
Limiting capital punishment to convicted murderers of prison inmates or guards
would not answer all criticisms of the death penalty, but it would dramatically narrow the
number of people on death row. As a result, some death penalty critics seem willing to
accept the death penalty in such circumstances.18 For those who insist on complete
abolition, however, if the abolitionist drive to eradicate the death penalty is an irresistible
force, then the ongoing move to limit (if not ban) solitary confinement is an irresistible
force with an opposing vector, leaving the safety of other inmates as the immovable
object. Something has to give.

185

See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and

the DenialofHuman Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 597 (2006) (arguing that state laws permitting chemical
castration of convicted sex offenders violate the Eighth Amendment).
116 See, e.g., Alarcon et al., supra note 40, at S182-S183 (noting
the narrowness of the federal death penalty in
practice, with 11 of 58 on federal death row for murdering other inmates, guards, or during escape); CAL.
COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 13 8-39 (Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008), available at

http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (recommending the retention of the death penalty for a
narrow set of cases, including murdering another prisoner). Admittedly, restriction of the death penalty to such a
purely incapacitation-based pool of murderers is unlikely to garner public support, as it would mean that killers
of convicted prisoners are punished more harshly than killers of police officers, children, or even the United
States President. Cf Stephen L. Caner, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 444 (1988) (noting
the result of the Baldus study that "[w]hen flexible juries use their discretion to impose the ultimate penalty, the
lives of victims who happen to be black are simply worth less").
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